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C.V.C. v. SUPERIOR COURT: COURT VERSUS
ADOPTION AGENCY CONTROL OF AGENCY
ADOPTIONS BEFORE A PETITION
FOR ADOPTION IS FILED
The statutes governing agency adoption, a procedure which is en-
tirely statutory in California,' have not been a fertile field for litiga-
tion in this state,' probably because they thoroughly and fairly regu-
late the process of adopting children. However, litigation has resulted
in a series of five decisions clarifying the few points that the statutes
do not explicitly cover.' C.V.C. v. Superior Court,4 a 1973 decision
by the Third District Court of Appeal, is 'the sixth in this series of
cases. C.V.C. more clearly defined the interrelated functions of adop-
tion agencies and courts in determining the acceptability of a proposed
adoption during the period after an agency places a child with its pros-
pective adoptive parents 5 but before the prospective parents file a peti-
tion to comlete the child's adoption. This is the only period during
which these functions are not clearly defined by statute.
The controversy in C.V.C. was the result of the Sacramento
County Adoption Agency's unsuccessful placement of an eighteen-
month-old girl with Mr. and Mrs. C. The agency terminated the
placement and removed the girl from the Cs' home after learning that
Mr. C was attending the Sacramento County Alcoholic Rehabilitation
Center. Mr. and Mrs. C's only opportunity to contest this decision
at the agency level was an informal meeting with the agency personnel
who made the original decision. 6 The court reviewed this procedure
1. Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal. 2d 447, 452, 274 P.2d 860, 862 (1954); see
CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 221-30.5 (West 1954 & Supp. 1974).
2. Research for this note turned up fewer than a dozen cases involving agency
adoptions. Moreover, once a case has established a new principle, the same fact pat-
tern is rarely litigated again, at least at the appellate level.
3. Guardianship of Henwood, 49 Cal. 2d 639, 320 P.2d 1 (1958); Adoption of
McDonald, 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.
App. 3d 510, 95 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1971); Department of Adoptions v. Superior Court,
2 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 82 Cal. Rptr. 882; Adoption of Runyon, 268 Cal. App. 2d 918,
74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1969). See notes 29-40, 67-69 & accompanying text infra.
4. 29 Cal. App. 3d 909, 106 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1973).
5. "Prospective adoptive parents" defines persons with whom a child has been
placed for adoption before the adoption is legally complete.
6. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 912-14, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
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and held that unless the child is in immediate danger, due process
requirements compel an evidentiary hearing before the agency can
terminate an adoptive placement; further the agency's decision to
terminate that placement can be subjected to an independent judicial
review. 7
The holdings in the C.V.C. decision provide important protection
for prospective adoptive parents against arbitrary -agency decisions.
The procedural protection afforded by C.V.C. will -also safeguard
agency-placed children from the trauma of an unnecessary separation
from their prospective parents without the risk of their remaining in
an immediately harmful environment. Finally, the proteotion afforded
both the prospective parents and the child by C.V.C. should not un-
duly interfere with the ability of adoption agencies to arrange and
supervise the adoption of children in their custody.
Agency Adoptions in California
An understanding of the C.V.C. decision requires an understand-
ing of the process of agency adoption in California." Licensed agen-
cies' placement of children for adoption is one of two primary adoption
procedures in California.' These adoption agencies are operated
either by the couaty welfare departments or by private individuals.' 0
They must be licensed by the State Department of Health" and are
the only entity other than a child's legal parents which can place it
for adoption.'2  One or both of a child's parents may relinquish it to
an adoption agency;' 3 such a relinquishment is binding and may be
7. Id. at 917, 919, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128, 130.
8. See generally Note, Adoption Agencies in California: Lack of Adequate
Control?, 5 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 512 (1972).
9. Independent adoptions are also authorized in California. CALIFORNIA STATE
DEPT. OF SocIAL WELFARE, ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA] (a pamphlet designed to inform the public of how to adopt
a child). Independent adoptions and the statutes which regulate that process are con-
trasted with agency adoptions in notes 12-24 infra. Three other types of adoption in
California involve the adoption of foreign born children, the adoption of stepchildren,
and the adoption of adults by older adults. ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra, at 2.
10. For a list of the public and private adoption agencies in California, see ADop-
T1ONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 13-16.
11. "Any person other than a parent or any organization, association, or corpora-
tion that, without holding a valid and unrevoked license or permit to place children
for adoption issued by the State Department of Health, places any child for adoption
is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. CIV. CODE § 224q (West Supp. 1974).
12. Id. An independent adoption is initiated by a child's parents placing it as
permitted by section 224q. ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 5.
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224m (West Supp. 1974). This section provides that the
father or mother may relinquish a child to a licensed adoption agency. However, the
consent of the nonrelinquishing parent is still required by section 224 of the California
Civil Code unless one of the other provisions limiting the need for parental consent
rescinded only by the mutual consent of the adoption agency and the
relinquishing parent or parents. 14  However, adoption agencies fre-
quently obtain a child for placement when it has been declared free
from the custody and control of its parents by the superior court.'"
After acquiring a child, the agency undertakes the task of screen-
ing applicants who wish to become adoptive parents in order to place
the child in a suitable home. 16 After the child has been placed with
its prospective adoptive parents, they necessarily undertake their par-
ental duties even though 'the adoption remains legally incomplete.' 7
During this interim period the agency maintains contact with the child
and its prospective parents by providing services designed to make the
child's integration into its new family as smooth as possible.' 8
To initiate the procedure required to finalize the adoption, the
prospective parents must file a petition for adoption in the superior
court of the county in which they reside' 9 at least six months after
the initial placement..20  The State Department of Health or the li-
censed county adoption agency then investigates the proposed adop-
tion and submits a full report, together with a recommendation regard-
ing the granting of the petition to the superior court; this report and
accompanying recommendation must be submitted within 180 days of
to an adoption applies. Id. § 224. In an independent adoption, the parent or parents
consent to adoption by the specific person or persons with whom they place the child.
Id.; ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 5.
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224m (West Supp. 1974). In an independent adoption,
consent to the adoption may not be withdrawn without court approval. The court must
approve the withdrawal of consent if it finds that the withdrawal is in the best interests
of the child and is reasonable in view of all the circumstances. Id. § 226a.
15. Interview with Dorothy Murphy, San Francisco County Adoption Agency, in
San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 7, 1973. Under section 232 of the Civil Code, a child may
be declared free from the custody and control of either or both parents. The section
specifies the conditions under which the parents may be deprived of their child. These
include abandonment, cruel treatment, and a parent's conviction of a felony resulting
in confinement for a long period of time. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1974).
The consent of a mother or father to his or her child's adoption is not required
when he or she has been judicially deprived of its custody and control. Id. § 224(1).
16. ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 4. In an independent adoption,
the parent or parents make this initial decision. See note 13 supra. However, even
in an independent adoption, the Department of Health or the licensed county adoption
agency must ascertain "whether the child is a proper subject for adoption and whether
the proposed home is suitable for the child .... ".CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.2 (West
Supp. 1974).
17. The adopting parents and the child "sustain toward each other the legal rela-
tionship of parent and child" only after the granting of the petition for adoption. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 227 (West Supp. 1974). The same is true of independent adoptions. Id.
18. ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 5.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226 (West Supp. 1974). This section also applies to in-
dependent adoptions. Id.
20. ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 9.
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the filing of the petition.21  However, if -the adoption agency is a party
or joins in -the petition, as it usually does, 22 the Department of Health
may waive this requirement. 23  The superior court considers the peti-
tion and the evidence presented to it and "[i]f satisfied that the in-
terest of the child will be promoted by the adoption . . . make[s]
and enter[s] a decree of adoption of the child by the adopting parent
or parents. The child and the adopting parents [then] sustain toward
each other the legal relationship of parent and child and have all the
rights and [are] subject to all the duties of that relation." 24
When Court and Agency Disagree: The Procedural
Problems with Agency Adoptions
During the course of an agency adoption, both the adoption
agency and the superior court play a role in deciding whether an adop-
tion should take place. Ordinarily, once the agency makes an initial
determination of the desirability of an adoption by placing a child in
a home, the superior court routinely approves the prospective adoptive
parents' petition for adoption.25 This consistently occurs because the
superior court agrees with the agency's placement of a child; in addi-
tion, the agency does not change its evaluation of the situation before
the adoption becomes final. However, this pattern is sometimes
broken;28 hence, it has been necessary for the California courts and
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.6 (West Supp. 1974). This section also applies to in-
dependent adoptions. Id.
22. See ADOPTIONS iN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 9. This pamphlet states that
"[tihe adoption agency joins with the adopting parents in the petition to the court
." The pamphlet does not even mention the possibility that the agency might re-
fuse to join in the petition, if it no longer believes the adoption is desirable.
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 226.6 (West Supp. 1974).
24. Id. § 227. This section also applies to independent adoptions. Id.
25. Interviews with San Francisco Bay Area county adoption agencies indicate
that at least 90% of all agency placements fit this pattern and that in less than 1%
of agency adoptions is the placement terminated against the will of the prospective
adoptive parents. Interview with Dorothy Murphy, San Francisco County Adoption
Agency, in San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 7, 1973 (two returns out of 104 placements in
1972, all voluntary); telephone interview with Julie Washington, Santa Clara County
Adoption Agency, Dec. 12, 1973 (nine returns out of approximately 100 placements
in 1972, all voluntary); telephone interviews with Lillian Baird, Alameda County
Adoption Agency, Dec. 19, 1973 and Jan. 29, 1974 (approximately a 10% rate of vol-
untary return and one or two involuntary returns out of approximately 100 placements
a year).
26. Another possibility for disruption of the process is that the prospective par-
ents will not wish to complete the adoption. If so, they then return the child to the
adoption agency. The agency remains responsible for the support of a child relin-
quished to it until it reaches adulthood if a petition for its adoption is never granted.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974); ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNA, supra note 9,
at 3. CAl. Cxv. CODE H§ 226b, 226c (West Supp. 1974) govern the voluntary with.
legislature to define precisely the limits of judicial and agency control
of the adoption process.
Resolution of the Conflict Between Agency and Court Power
Previous Developments
Because C.V.C. is the most recent step in a developing definition
of judicial and administrative powers, the four developments prior to
it must be delineated. Section 224n of the California Civil Code,2"
enacted in 1953, is the central statutory provision governing agency-
court interaotion in this area. This section originally gave the adoption
agency the right to custody of any child relinquished to it and required
-the adoption agency to care for any relinquished child. The section
further specified that the termination of an adoptive placement was
within the agency's discretion until the petition for adoption had been
granted by the superior court.18
These original provisions are still in effect, but they have been
refined both by the judiciary and by the legislature. The initial clarifi-
cation of section 224n was the 1954 decision of Adoption of McDon-
ald,2 9 in which the supreme court held that the superior court has the
power to grant a petition for the adoption of a child relinquished to
an adoption agency even if the agency refuses to consent to the adop-
tion."0  The superior court need only find "that the refusal to consent
is not in the best interest of the child." 1
The judicial power to grant a petition without the agency's con-
sent is not absolute, however. A 1955 amendment to section 224n1
2
established that -the agency's power to make an initial determination
of the desirability of a given adoption is exclusive by providing that
only the prospective adoptive parents with whom the child has been
placed by the agency can file a petition for that child's adoption. This
part of section 224n was challenged in Adoption of Runyon3" as viola-
drawal of a petition for adoption and the subsequent removal of the child from the
petitioners' home.
27. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
28. Cal. Stat. 1953, ch. 1122, § 1, at 2617.
29. 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
30. Id. at 460, 274 P.2d at 867-68.
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974). This part of section 224n, en-
acted in 1955, codified the McDonald holding. Section 226.3 does require the consent
of the county adoption agency or the State Department of Health to an agency adop-
tion if the agency that placed the child does not become a party to the proceeding.
Id. § 226.3. However, section 226.4 allows the superior court to grant the petition
for adoption without the consent of these entities on an appeal from the refusal to con-
sent just as it can without the consent of the agency placing the child. Id. § 226.4.
32. Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 949, § 1, at 1835.
33. 268 Cal. App. 2d 918, 74 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1969).
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ting equal protection and due process guarantees. However, the Third
District Court of Appeal found that the classification was reasonable,
and therefore constitutional, because the adoption agency needed to
be free to make a determination of the suitability of potential parents.
Complementing the judicial power -to grant a petition for adoption
without the agency's consent, a 1957 'amendment to section 224n 4
limited the agency's right to regain custody of a child which it had
previously placed. That ,amendment provided that any -time after the
petition for adoption has been filed, "the agency may remove the child
from the prospective adoptive parents only with the approval of the
court, upon motion by the agency after notice to the prospective adop-
tive parents, supported by an affidavit or affidavits stating the grounds
on which removal is sought. '35
The Remaining Problem
Under section 224n as it presently reads, the interaction between
the agency's and the court's control over the agency adoption process
becomes problematic only when the agency decides before the pro-
spective parents have filed the petition for adoption that the home in
which it has placed a child is unsuitable. The holding in Adoption
of McDonald"6 was applicable in this situation for only about a year.
In holding 'that the agency's consent to an, agency adoption is not
necessary, the McDonald court did grant a petition filed after the
agency had terminated the placement. However, when McDonald
was decided in 1954, section 224n did not contain the provision allow-
ing only the prospective adoptive parents with whom the child had
been placed to file a petition for the adoption of that child. 7 While
a subsequent court of appeal decision 'has held -that neither the death
of one of the prospective adoptive parents nor their divorce eliminates
the surviving or separated spouse who still wants to ;adopt from the
statutory category of persons with whom the child has been placed for
adoption,3 the termination of the placement by the adoption agency
does remove the prospective -adoptive parents from this category and
makes them ineligible to file the petition for adoption.8 9 Consequent-
ly, the superior court has no power to decree an adoption after such
a termination despite the fact that it does not need agency consent
34. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1237, § 1, at 2545.
35. CAL. CIV. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
36. 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
37. See note 32 supra & accompanying text.
38. County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 1065, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 882, 885 (1969).
39. Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. App. 3d 510, 512, 95 Cal. Rptr. 923,
924 (1971).
to grant a petition for adoption once it is before the court. In C.V.C.
the superior court and, in turn, the appellate court were confronted
with the result of one such -termination, people who felt they had been
unjustly denied the opportunity to petition the superior court to com-
plete an adoption they had undertaken with the help of an agency.4
C.V.C. v. Superior Court
The Facts
In C.V.C. v. Superior Court, an adoption agency placed an eigh-
teen-month-old girl with Mr. and Mrs. C as her prospective adoptive
parents. Eight months later the agency terminated the placement
after an anonymous phone call led to the discovery that Mr. C was at-
tending therapy sessions at the Sacramento County Alcoholic Rehabili-
tation Center. The agency decided to terminate the child's placement
after a meeting of the social worker in charge of the case, her super-
visor, and the agency's mental health consultant. A subsequent meet-
ing between the agency and the Cs produced no change in the agency's
decision. 41
The agency filed a habeas corpus petition with the Sacramento
County Superior Court to secure the child's return to the agency's physi-
cial custody.4" Mr. and Mrs. C responded by filing a petition for
a writ of mandate seeking judicial review of the agency's decision.43
The two actions were consolidated, and the superior court, finding no
abuse of the 'agency's discretion, ordered the prospective parents to
return the child to the agency. The Cs immediately filed a notice
of appeal with the Third District Court of Appeal, but because the
superior court refused to stay -the enforcement of its order, the agency
placed the child in another home.44
40. Rodriguez also confronted a similar factual situation. In that case, the Stan-
islaus County Adoption Agency terminated the placement of a child before its prospec-
tive adoptive parents had filed a petition for adoption. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal stated that the "manifest importance of an adoption to the welfare of a child,
as well as the importance to the prospective parents and to the state" compelled it to
conclude that the termination should be subject to judicial review under sections 1084
and 1085 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 513, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
However, because the court did not support its conclusion any further, this note will
discuss C.V.C. rather than the Rodriguez case.
41. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 912-14, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 125-26.
42. A writ of habeas corpus forces the production of a person by the people hold-
ing him. It is usually issued in a penal context, but it is also available to force the
return of a minor child to those entitled to its custody. In re Barr, 39 Cal. 2d 25,
27, 243 P.2d 787, 788 (1952).
43. A writ of mandate is issued to compel an inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person to perform a legally required act. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1085
(West 1955).
44. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 131. In fairness to the trial court,
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The Holding and Its Consequences
The appellate court held that -absent an imminent danger to the
child's health or safety, due process requires an administrative hearing
before the agency can deprive the prospective adoptive parents of the
child's custody.45 It further held -that because a fundamental interest
was involved, the superior court should 'have overturned the agency's
decision if it found that the decision was contrary to the weight of
the evidence rather -than merely determining whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to support the agency decision.46
This holding returns final authority to the judiciary to determine
whether a child should remain in the prospective parents' home any
time after the agency's initial placement of the child. While an adop-
tion agency still retains the power to terminate the prospective adop-
tive parents' right 'to file the petition for adoption by terminating its
placement of the child, it cannot do so without a hearing. Significantly,
the determination made in 'that hearing is now subject to an indepen-
dent judicial review by the superior court. Thus, the superior court,
which would have had final authority to decide the petition for adop-
tion if it had been filed even over the agency's objection, can now
guarantee to prospective adoptive parents ,the right to file -that petition
in the first place.
This holding equalizes the legal rights of prospective adoptive
parents before and after they file their petition for adoption. Section
224n already specifically compels court review of an agency disap-
proval in the latter situation.4 7  This note will discuss the reasoning
used by the C.V.C. court to justify its holding, and will suggest addi-
tional support for its sound, but incomplete, reasoning.
Procedural Due Process and the Termination of
an Agency Placement
The Court's Application of the Procedural Due Process Test
The C.V.C. court correctly set forth the test for determining
whether an individual interest warrants the procedural protection of
the due process clause.
Entitlement to procedural protections depends upon the extent to
which "grievous loss" is threatened; it requires the court to weigh
it should be noted that according to the Sacramento County counsel, the order had al-
ready been executed when the application for a stay was made. Telephone interview
with Steve Burris, Sacramento County Counsel, March 14, 1974. An executed order
cannot be stayed. Superior Court v. District Court of Appeal, 65 Cal. 2d 293, 295,
419 P.2d 183, 185, 54 Cal. Rptr. 119, 121 (1966).
45. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
46. Id. at 919-20, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130-31.
47. See note 35 supra & accompanying text.
the individual's interest in avoiding the loss against the govern-
mental interest in summary adjudication. 48
Obviously, the first step in weighing these two interests is a deter-
mination of their precise nature. 49  The court described the parents'
interest first:
Gain of a child for adoption fulfills the prospective parents' most
cherished hopes. The event marks the onset of a close and mean-
ingful relationship. The emotional investment does not await the
ultimate decreee of adoption. Love and mutual dependence set
in ahead of official cachets, administrative or judicial. The place-
ment initiates the " 'closest conceivable counterpart of the relation-
ship of parent and child.' "50
The court in this way clearly described -the prospective adoptive par-
ents' interest as the opportunity to continue in the parent-child rela-
,tionship which the placement necessarily initiates. The court then de-
scribed the governmental interest as "the need for terminating [the
placement] without prior notice and hearing" in contrast with "the
need for terminating the placement." 51
The court apparently relied on three factors in deciding that the
prospective parents' interest outweighs the adoption agency's govern-
mental interests. The first of these factors, that administrative con-
venience is not a strong governmental interest, is inherent in the point-
edness with which the court differentiated between a governmental in-
terest in terminating the placement and a governmental interest in ter-
minating the placement without prior notice and hearing. This is a le-
gitimate distinction: it indicates that the individual interest need not
be as weighty to receive procedural protection as it would need to be
to receive substantive protection, the guarantee against any governmen-
tal deprivation whatsoever. The governmental interest in a procedural
due process case, however, can always be characterized as an interest
in summary adjudication; hence, it can always be argued that because
procedural due process merely causes administrative inconvenience,
the governmental interest should defer to the individual's interest.
This method of characterizing the government's interest does not re-
solve the issue of why one individual interest should be considered im-
mune from summary deprivation while another should not.
The second factor on which the court apparently relied was the
risk of harm to the child inherent in requiring a hearing before the
termination of the adoptive placement. It stated that where the child's
48. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 915, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 127, citing Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63 (1970).
49. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970); Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
50. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128, quoting Adoption of Barnett,
54 Cal. 2d 370, 377, 354 P.2d 18, 22, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562, 566 (1960).
51. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
September 1974] POST-PLACEMENT ADOPTION CONTROL 321
disadvantage is potential or ultimate, the governmental interest "may
with equanimity afford the time and effort consumed by due pro-
cess."5  This consideration is certainly legitimate, 53 especially since
the adoption process above all else is supposed to serve the "best in-
terests of the child.""5
Finally, the court relied upon the fact that section 224n provides
for notice and hearing if the agency wishes to remove the child after
the petition for adoption has been filed. The fact -that the legislature
afforded the prospective adoptive parents -this protection under the
merely technically different circumstances of a termination after filing
of the petition for adoption indicated to the court -that the legislature
considered the prospective parents' interest more important than the
governmental interest which it created in the adoption statutes. Since
both the governmental and the individual interests involved were cre-
ated by the adoption statutes,5 5 the legislature's view of their relative
importance is significant.
Further Arguments Supporting the Court's Decision in C.V.C.
The court's analysis is perceptive and inherently appealing as far
as it goes. However, there are at least -two additional areas which
the court could have utilized to support its holding -that Mr. and Mrs.
C were entitled to procedural due process protection.
Due Process Case Law
First, the C.V.C. court could have relied more heavily on existing
due process cases for support. Both the United States Supreme Court
and the California courts have given the parental status procedural due
process protection.5 6  In addition, the recent United States Supreme
Court case of Morrissey v. Brewer57 inferentially supports giving the
imperfect parental status of prospective adoptive parents this protec-
tion. Morrissey recognized that -an individual interest which would
normally be protected by -the due process clause does not lose this
protection simply because it is incomplete or lacks certain elements
usually associated with it.58 In holding that a parolee's liberty comes
52. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 917, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
53. "Mhe degree of danger caused by the proscribed condition or activity" is
one of the variables to be considered in a due process case. Sokol v. Public Utilities
Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 254, 418 P.2d 265, 270, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 678 (1966).
54. Guardianship of Henwood, 49 Cal. 2d 639, 644, 320 P.2d 1, 3 (1958). See
CAL. Crv. CODnE §§ 224n, 226a, 226.4, 227 (West Supp. 1974).
55. See note 1 supra & accompanying text.
56. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Gloria M. v. Superior Court, 21
Cal. App. 3d 525, 527, 98 Cal. Rptr. 604, 605 (1971); Lois R. v. Superior Court, 19
Cal. App. 3d 895, 901-902, 97 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (1971).
57. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
58. Id. at 481-82.
within the protection of the due process clause, Chief Justice Burger
stated: "We see . . . that the liberty of a parolee, although indeter-
minate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and
its termination inflicts -a 'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on
others." 9  To paraphrase this statement, the interest of prospective
parents contains many of the core values of unqualified parenthood.
The parents' economic and emotional expenditures, outlays which are
among the most important in a parent-child relationship, have already
commenced even though the relationship is subjected to closer scrutiny
and control than legal parenthood. 60  That relationship is as much en-
titled to due process protection -as is the interest in full legal parent-
hood.
Construction of Adoption Statutes
The second area of support which the C.V.C. court could have
considered is the impact of the adoption statutes and applicable rules
of construction on the issue of whether due process protects prospec-
tive adoptive parents. While the California adoption statutes obvious-
ly cannot operate to deprive prospective adoptive parents of their con-
stitutional right to procedural due process, the statutes created the in-
terests to be weighed and therefore determine their nature in large
part.6 As the court's summary of the statutory scheme fully empha-
sizes, the agency's power is broad and the parents' status provisional:
The statutory system for relinquishment to the agency, for agency
placement and agency approval, bespeaks a state policy to pro-
mote the child's welfare in derogation of all other values. Civil
Code section 224n . . .distinctly expresses the state's ongoing in-
terest in terminating an agency placement whenever the child's
welfare is endangered. It expresses a legislative design to give the
prospective parents only provisional and tentative status until they
file an adoption petition. Until then, the licensed adoption agency
is entitled to custody and control "at all times;" the placement may
be terminated "at any time" at the agency's discretion; upon termi-
nation the child is to be returned "promptly" to the physical cus-
tody of the agency. These firm legislative expressions were de-
signed to elevate the placement agency's discernment of danger
above the interests of the prospective parents.62
59. Id. at 482.
60. People may not be aware that legal parents may be judicially deprived of
their children, but it does happen. See note 15 supra.
61. Adoption is entirely statutory in California. See note 1 supra & accompany-
ing text. However, this does not mean that adoption statutes are the only factor deter-
mining individual and governmental interests in adoption. The legislature cannot, for
example, decree when the prospective parent and child will begin to depend emotionally
on each other.
62. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 916, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
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This statement is extremely unfavorable to the position that prospec-
tive adoptive parents are entitled to procedural due process protection;
yet the court only dealt with the statement's implications of the legis-
latively determined attributes of the two interests by noting that sec-
tion 224n provides for a hearing after a petition for adoption has been
filed.0 3 This provision would seem to support the contention that the
legislature also recognized that the governmental interest may "with
equanimity afford the time and effort consumed by due process."0' 4
However, it is not enough by itself to counter these "firm legislative
expressions . . . designed to elevate the placement agency's discern-
ment of danger above the interests of the prospective parents."65
The court could also have utilized two rules of statutory construc-
tion which the California courts have applied to adoption statutes
where there has been the possibility of two interpretations of the sta-
tute. First, California courts have recognized that all the adoption
statutes were enacted by the legislature to serve -the child's best in-
terests.0 6  In Guardianship of Henwood,67 -the California Supreme
Court recognized that this policy of carefully protecting the child's in-
terests means that the statutory power given to adoption agencies is
not -s -absolute as the statutory language might seem to indicate. In
that case the court held that guardianship proceedings are available
to protect children relinquished to adoption agencies if for some rea-
son the adoption procedure is not running its proper course. 8  The
Henwood court stated:
We cannot assume that adoption agencies will necessarily in all
cases have such wisdom and competence that they may be set
apart from other custodians and given carte blanche in their con-
trol of relinquished children until a petition for adoption is before
the court.6 9
Of course, this rule of construction does not conclusively prove
that the exercise of less control by the adoption agency after the child's
initial placement would best serve the child's interests. In making this
determination, ,two factors must be considered: first, whether the child
would be harmed physically or psychologically by remaining in the
prospective adoptive parents' home during the hearing procedure; and,
63. The court also dealt with the statement by considering those factors which
by their nature cannot be legislatively decreed, i.e., when the parent-child relationship
will begin and what is in fact in the best interests of the child. See notes 50, 52-
54 supra & accompanying text.
64. See note 52 & accompanying text supra.
65. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
66. See note 54 supra & accompanying text.
67. 49 Cal. 2d 639, 320 P.2d 1 (1958).
68. Id. at 644, 320 P.2d at 3-4.
69. Id. at 644, 320 P.2d at 3.
second, whether the child would be harmed by an unnecessary inter-
ruption of the relationship with its prospective parents.
Interviews with San Francisco Bay Area adoption workers indi-
cate that the likelihood of harm in the first situation is remote. Some
adoption agencies already have hearing procedures available to pro-
spective adoptive parents which seem to function without endangering
the child.70  Moreover, even before the C.V.C. decision, the State De-
partment of Health had developed a suggested hearing procedure,7'
at least partially in response to agency workers' complaints about
termination procedures. 2 The C.V.C. decision of course means that
these suggestions or some other procedure is now mandatory; yet al-
though one agency worker believes that a hearing procedure will
hamper her work somewhat,73 not one of the agencies which this
writer contacted is alarmed about having to comply with a mandatory
hearing procedure.
On the other hand, an unnecessary interruption of the parent-child
relationship is unquestionably harmful to the child. This statement
reflects the experience of most people, including adoption workers. 4
The social scientific literature relevant to the kind of brief separation
that would result from the child's unnecessary removal from the pro-
spective parents' home is sparse; 75 what literature is available, how-
ever, indicates that this type of separation is a traumatic experience
for a child, the effects of which do not cease immediately upon re-
union.
A substantial number of children placed by agencies are over two
years old.7 6  Yet even as early as the age of six months, "the infant
70. Interview with Dorothy Murphy, San Francisco County Adoption Agency, in
San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 7, 1973.
71. This suggested procedure provides for a ten day written notice of the agency's
intention to terminate the placement unless the child is clearly endangered, a hearing
before the county welfare department, and finally a hearing before the State Depart-
ment of Health. It also provides for a right of representation, the taking of evidence,
and a written decision by the hearing officer. California State Department of Health,
Notice, Hearing, and Appeal Procedure[:] Adoptions and Foster Care Programs (re-
vised Jan. 4, 1973).
72. Interview with Dorothy Murphy, San Francisco County Adoption Agency, in
San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 7, 1973.
73. Telephone interview with Julie Washington, Santa Clara County Adoption
Agency, Dec. 12, 1973.
74. Interview with Dorothy Murphy, San Francisco County Adoption Agency, in
San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 7, 1973.
75. Id.
76. In San Francisco, approximately half the children placed in 1972 were over
two years old. Id. Other Bay Area agencies stated that very young infants are no
longer available for placement. Telephone interview with Julie Washington, Santa
Clara County Adoption Agency, Dec. 12, 1973; telephone interview with Lillian Baird,
Alameda County Adoption Agency, Dec. 19, 1973.
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has learned to recognize his mother -as a unique individual. He there-
fore reaots with anxiety to separation from her, and to being with a
stranger. If intense and prolonged, This separation anxiety may be
psychologically injurious to the older infant."" The possibility of
permanent loss to the child can be particularly acute for some of the
older children which adoption -agencies handle.7  These children have
often been without a permanent parent-child relationship for a long
time. As a result, some of them experience difficulty in forming any
kind of parent-child relationship.79 Disrupting such a partially formed
relationship could conceivably mean that such 'a child will never de-
velop that bond.
The Child Development Research Unit of the Tavistock Institute
of Human Relations and the Tavistock Clinic puqblished a study in
1965 which documented typical responses of two-year-olds to brief sep-
arations from their parents8 0 These separations lasted from two to
twenty weeks, during which time the children were cared for in a nur-
sery because their parents were temporarily unable to care for them.8 '
The following behavioral patterns were -typical in these children during
the period of separation."2  The initial uneasiness which -the children
experienced upon arriving at the nursery became pronounced as soon
as their parents left them. For the first three days longing for their
parents' return dominated the children's behavior; this behavior later
decreased, and the children began exhibiting less affection toward
their visiting parents. Parental visits produced sadness and resigna-
tion, 3 excessive cheerfulness, and self-injury 4 in the children after
two weeks of separation. While the children exhibited less affection
towards their parents, the memory of the separation from them remained
painful; many re-enacted the initial separation. Behavior towards a
77. V. BERNARD, ADOPTIoN 75 (1964). See C. HEINEcKm & L Ws-THEIMER,
BRIEF SEPARATIONS 5 (1965).
78. In San Francisco, for example, approximately 20% of the children placed in
1972 were over seven years old. Interview with Dorothy Murphy, San Francisco
County Adoption Agency, in San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 7, 1973.
79. Id. Dorothy Murphy stated that such children are often placed with single
people. The rationale for this policy is that these children are often more capable of
relating to a single person as an older sibling rather than to a couple as parents.
80. C. HEINECKE & I. WESTHEIMER, BRIEF SEPARMIONS (1965).
81. In nine of the ten cases studied, the mother had been forced to go to the
hospital and the father was unable to care for the child by himself. In the tenth case,
the family was homeless. Id. at 71.
82. Id. at 159-79.
83. The behavior characterized by this description included "staring into space
for long periods of time . . . and forms of silent sadness suggested by body posture
and facial expression rather than by open crying." Id. at 177.
84. Self-injury included "all those behaviors where the child actively injured parts
of his body, whether 'accidentally' or not." Id.
favorite object brought by them from home paralleled the child's chang-
ing response to its parents and was initially affectionate, then alter-
nately affectionate and hostile. Attachment to parental substitutes was
minimal even though the children increasingly developed favorites
among the nurses who cared for them. 5
The children experienced 'additional difficulties at the nursery.
They initially suffered difficulty in sleeping and often refused to coop-
erate in the nursery routine. While these particular problems dimin-
ished greatly or stopped altogether, specific forms of uncooperative-
ness did continue. Additionally, eight of the ten children in the study
became ill during the separation, and all but one experienced a break-
down in their toilet training. The children began to use fewer words
than when they had first entered the nursery."6
There were other problems after the children were reunited with
their parents. 87  All children initially exhibited a lack of affection for
their mothers.8 8  This lack of affection continued during the first three
days of reunion in all but one child. Eight children afterwards became
openly ambivalent towards their mothers, being first hostile and defiant,
then affectionate. In five of these children, this ambivalence lasted at
least twelve weeks. While most of the children appeared to have
recovered completely from the separation at the end of -twenty weeks, a
few showed some continuing difficulty.89
The study concluded that it is "the loss of the specific relationship
to the mother and father that constitutes the essential and most signifi-
cant aspect of the traumatic event . . . ."9 Even though these chil-
dren eventually recovered from their experiences, it is obvious that
an unnecessary separation of the child from its prospective adoptive
parents should be avoided.
The second rule of statutory construction which the California
courts have used in interpreting adoption statutes is that "[w]henever
possible, such a construction should be given adoption laws as will sus-
tain, rather than defeat, the object they have in view. The main pur-
pose of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of children,
85. Id. at 159-79.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 214-27.
88. Most children did not exhibit a similar lack of affection for their fathers af-
ter reunion. The researchers suggest no explanation for this difference in response, but
it could be related to the different roles which the two parents usually undertake during
the early stages of child rearing.
89. One child still showed occasional hostility toward her mother. Another child
enacted an elaborate bedtime ritual in which his mother "lost" him and wept until she
"found" him under his covers. Id. at 156, 225-26.
90. Id. at 326. For a theoretical discussion of the meaning of the study's find-
ings see id. at 323-45.
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bereft of the benefits of the home and care of their real parents, by
-the legal recognition and regulation of the consummation of -the clos-
est conceivable counterpart of the relationship of parent and child."' '91
This statement is analytically ambiguous. An adoption agency could
argue that the statutory interpretation that will best sustain the object
of the adoption stattes is that which favors broad agency discretion
without judicial interference since it gives trained and experienced
adoption workers free rein to exercise their expertise and thus bring
about a truly satisfactory match between a child and the adopting par-
ents. However, an examination of the two cases applying this rule
of construction -to agency adoptions clearly shows that the courts would
not reach this result.
In Adoption of McDonald,2 the California Sqpreme Court ap-
plied this rule and concluded that the adoption statutes do not prohibit
a superior court from granting a petition for adoption without the
agency's consent; in County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,3 the
appellate court interpreted the statutory category of "prospective adop-
ive parents with whom the child has been placed for adoption by the
adoption agency" 4 -to include one member of a couple who had been
divorced after the child had been placed with them. In McDonald,
while the court's arguments for granting the petition without agency
consent are very persuasive, the statutes did not state whether or not the
agency's consent to an adoption was required. In County of Los Angeles
the court could easily have accepted the agency's argument that the
statutory language required both partners with whom a child had been
placed to join in the petition for adoption since the agency had
chosen the couple as suitable parents ather than one or the other
alone. In applying the rule of construction favoring completion of
adoption, the courts in both cases did not use the rule 'to promote
adoption in 'the general sense of allowing the adoption agency free
rein in the exercise of its expertise; instead they used it to ensure com-
pletion of the adoption already undertaken, if, of course, the superior
court on remand found that it was in the "best interests of the child."
An application of this rule to the factual situation in C.V.C. would
have compelled the result which the court reached. To the extent
that both the government's interest in summary adjudication and the
prospective parents' interest in procedural protection are equally im-
91. Adoption of Barnett, 54 Cal. 2d 370, 377, 354 P.2d 18, 22, 6 Cal. Rptr. 562,
566 (1960); Adoption of McDonald, 43 Cal. 2d 447, 459, 274 P.2d 860, 867 (1954);
In re Santos, 185 Cal. 127, 130, 195 P. 1055, 1057 (1921); County of Los Angeles
v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 1064, 82 Cal. Rptr. 882, 884 (1969).
92. 43 Cal. 2d 447, 274 P.2d 860 (1954).
93. 2 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 82 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1969).
94. CAL. Civ. CODE § 224n (West Supp. 1974).
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portant under the due process test, the correct choice under this rule
is the one which allows the superior court the opportunity of finaliz-
ing the adoption already undertaken.
The Benefits of a Hearing in C.V.C.
The C.V.C. case is illustrative of the advantage of holding a hear-
ing in a proper situation. The evidence that was available to the ap-
pellate court in C.V.C. did not conclusively show that -the agency's de-
cision was correct. The evidence reported in the C.V.C. opinion
showed that Mr. C had told the county adoption agency that he did
not have a drinking problem even though he was attending therapy
sessions at the County Alcoholic Rehabilitation Center. This discrep-
ancy, and presumably the drinking problem itself, were the ostensible
reasons for the agency's decision -to terminate its placement of the
child with Mr. and Mrs. C. The social worker in charge of -the case
testified that "we couldn't trust what -they had said to us in the past,
and we didn't feel that we would have trust or confidence in what
they would tell us in the future.
'
"
9 5
There was no evidence that Mr. C was habitually intoxicated
in front of his children. The adoption agency obviously had observed
Mr. and Mrs. C's two natural children as well as their third child, pre-
viously adopted after a placement by the same agency, before deciding
to place the child with the family. These three children apparently
had suffered no adverse effects from the alleged drinking problem.
The C.V.C. court also stated that "[t]here was evidence to support
the belief that [Mr. and Mrs. C] were conscientious parents and main-
tained a wholesome family environment." 96 Mr. C was also successful
in holding down a responsible job that required many hours of over-
time work.
That these findings were insufficient to support the conclusion
that the C's were unfit to continue as the child's parents is apparent.
There was no finding that Mr. C's drinking problem would interfere
with his being a satisfactory father for the child. The evidence pre-
sented to the appellate court was alternately susceptible of the inter-
pretation that Mr. C was mature in acknowledging and seeking help
for his drinking problem, that he was self-controlled in overcoming
his problem, and that he was likely to give his children more guidance
in the proper use of alcohol than most parents because of his own
negative experience. The evidence in the record did not conclusively
support either interpretation of the facts.
Had the requirements for procedural due process been met, the
95. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 914, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
96. Id. at 913, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 126.
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C.V.C. court would not have had -to rely on such an inadequate re-
cord. The requirements for procedural due process most frequently
referred to are the disclosure of all incriminating evidence; an oppor-
tunity to be heard, to present evidence, and to confront witnesses; a
neutral hearing body; and a written statement of -the evidence relied
on and the reasons employed in making the decision. 97 Compliance
with these Tequirements in C.V.C. would have produced a written re-
cord of all the evidence supporting either the agency's or Mr. and
Mrs. C's viewpoint. Because the bases for the agency's decision
would have been clearly stated, the court's task of reviewing the deci-
sion would have been much easier.
A clearly defined procedure meeting these due process require-
ments is important to the prospective parents and the child because
it ensures that the agency's decision is actually based on the applica-
tion of its expertise -to information it has about a given case and that
it is not arbitrary. Apparently, a clearly defined procedure is also
necessary to protect adoption agencies. For example, the Sacramento
County counsel who represented the agency's interests in C.V.C.
stated that the agency originally had the impression -that Mr. and Mrs.
C did not wish to appeal the superior court's grant of the petition for
a writ of habeas corpus.98 The county counsel also indicated that had
the agency known the Cs wished to appeal, the agency might not have
removed the child from their home until after the appellate decision. 9
Without a clearly defined hearing procedure, this kind of confusion
can occur at any time during the process of terminating the adoptive
placement. However, such confusion could not have existed if all par-
ties had known exactly what procedures for appeal were available and
exactly what conditions had to be met before removal of the child
from the home was appropriate. As it was, the agency, the child, Mr.
and Mrs. C, and the prospective parents with whom the child was
placed after being removed from the Cs' home were all kept in doubt
from the time of the original termination, through the appeal to the
appellate court, until the Cs finally decided not to contest the termina-
tion on remand to the superior court.100
The Scope of Judicial Review of the Administrative Decision
Section 1094.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure01°
governs the issuance of a writ of mandate -to review a final adminis-
97. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
98. Telephone interview with Steve Burris, Sacramento County Counsel, March
5, 1974.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 1094.5 (West 1955).
trative decision made as the result of a proceeding in which a hearing
is required by law, evidence is required to be taken, and discretion
in the determination of the facts is vested in the agency.1"2 Section
1094.5 is clearly applicable to the decision of an adoption agency to
terminate an adoptive placement because due process requires that the
agency make a factual determination in an evidentiary hearing. How-
ever, the appropriate standard of review is not as clear. Section
1094.5 provides for two standards to guide the superior court's review
of such a decision: independent judicial review and review based on
a substantial evidence test. 0 3  In the former, the superior court deter-
mines whether the weight of the evidence supports the agency's deci-
sion. "' In the latter, the superior court merely determines whether
there is substantial evidence to support the agency's decision.0 5
Section 1094.5 states that the superior court may exercise its in-
dependent judgement where authorized by law, 0 6 but the extent of
this authorization is not specified anywhere in the code. Instead, it
is specified in the case law on administrative mandamus.' Soon after
mandamus became the accepted method of reviewing administrative
decisions, 10 8 the California Supreme Court drew a distinction between
the review of an agency decision affecting the restoration of a profes-
sional license and one affecting only the initial application for the li-
cense. 10 9  It held that an independent review was available only
102. All administrative decisions were reviewable by a writ of certiorari until
1936. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 138, 481 P.2d 242, 247, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234,
239 (1971). In 1936 the California Supreme Court held that the writ would not lie
to review the adjudicatory decisions of statewide agencies unless the California Consti-
tution authorized a specific agency to exercise judicial power. Standard Oil Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 6 Cal. 2d 57, 59 P.2d 119 (1936). The court held that Ar-
ticle VI, section 1 of the California Constitution, which specifies that the judicial power
of the state is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal
courts, and justice courts, precludes statewide administrative agencies from exercising
judicial power and the courts from issuing a writ of certiorari to review their decisions
since the writ reviews judicial decisions. In 1939, the California Supreme Court held
that a writ of mandamus is the proper means of reviewing the adjudicatory decisions
of these agencies. Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal.
2d 75, 87 P.2d 848 (1939). Because Article VI, section 1 does not apply below the
state level, certiorari still lies for the review of the decisions of local administrative
agencies, including adoption agencies. However, mandamus is the preferred method for
reviewing decisions of local agencies too. W. DEERING, CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIvE
MANDAMUS § 1.3 (1966).
103. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5(c) (West 1955).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 137-38, 140, 481 P.2d 242, 247, 249, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 234, 239, 241 (1971).
108. See note 102 supra.
109. McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal. 2d 741, 91 P.2d 1035 (1939).
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in the former situation.110  The case law developing this distinction
was recently summarized in the California Supreme Court case of
Bixby v. Pierno."' In Bixby the court concluded that this case law
authorizes the superior court to exercise its independent judgment
whenever an administrative decision substantially affects a vested, fun-
damental right. 112
C.V.C. held that the superior court should have exercised its in-
dependent judgment in reviewing -the adoption agency's decision to
terminate the adoptive placement because a fundamental constitution-
ally protected interest was at stake."' Even though the C.V.C. opin-
ion contains no discussion of the reason that the Cs' right to continue
as prospective adoptive parents is fundamental for the purpose of de-
termining the scope of judicial review of the agency decision, the hold-
ing is sound. Bixby states two important considerations in determin-
ing whether a particular ight is fundamental and therefore entitled
to the 'additional protection of judicial review based upon independent
judgment. The first consideration is "the effect of [the right] in hu-
man terms -and the importance of it to the individual in the life situa-
tion.""' 4 This framework of evaluation is clearly applicable to the
termination of a human relationship. The second consideration is
whether "[tihe abrogation of the right is too important -to the individu-
al to relegate it to exclusive administrative extinction.""' 5 Just as the
court held that the Cs' interest in continuing as prospective adoptive
parents outweighed the agency's interest in sunmary termination
under the due process test, the Cs' interest was obviously too impor-
tant to relegate it to "exclusive administrative extinction."
However, the C.V.C. opinion failed to mention that this funda-
mental right must be vested in order to warrant an independent judi-
cial review of its denial." 6 The C.V.C. court was not necessarily cor-
rect when it stated that a constitutionally protected interest is protected
110. Id.
111. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143, 481 P.2d 242, 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1971), citing
e.g., Yakov v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal. 2d 67, 435 P.2d 553, 64 Cal. Rptr.
785 (1968); Tringham v. State Bd. of Education, 50 Cal. 2d 507, 326 P.2d 850 (1958);
Nardoni v. McConnell, 48 Cal. 2d 500, 310 P.2d 644 (1957); Thomas v. Employment
Stabilization Comm'n, 39 Cal. 2d 501, 247 P.2d 561 (1952); Moran v. Board of Med-
ical Examiners, 32 Cal. 2d 301, 196 P.2d 20 (1948).
112. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143, 481 P.2d 242, 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1971). The
California Supreme Court recently held that the Bixby holding is also applicable to lo-
cal agencies such as adoption agencies. Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Re-
tirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 32, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1974).
113. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 919, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
114. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144, 481 P.2d 242, 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 244 (1971).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 143, 481 P.2d at 251, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 243.
by an independent review of the judgement. 117  For example, proce-
dural due process may require a hearing on the initial denial of wel-
fare benefits.'15 However, there are California cases which have held
that the initial denial of welfare benefits is reviewable only according
to the substantial evidence test and not according to the independent
judgment test." 9 Consequently, the C.V.C. court should have ex-
plicitly determined whether the Cs' interest in continuing as prospec-
tive adoptive parents was vested within the meaning of Bixby.
Bixby states that a right is vested "[o]nce the agency has initially
exercised its expertise and determined that an individual fulfills the
requirements to practice his profession . *.". ." ' Only the agency's
initial determination that those requirements have not been fulfilled
is not subjected to an independent judicial review.' 2 ' In an agency
adoption, the agency makes its initial determination when it first places
the child for adoption. The two basic assumptions upon which the
placement is made is that the placement will culminate in a legal adop-
tion122 and that the period during which the child is in the home be-
fore the adoption has been finalized exists primarily as an aid to the
prospective adoptive parents, not as an additional test of their quali-
fications. 123  Thus, the facts involved -in adoptions are analogous to
those involved in the revocation of a professional license, the kind of
situation out of which Bixby arose and in which it is often cited.' 24
When an administrative agency grants a professional license to
an applicant, that does not constitute a guarantee by the agency that
the licensee's right is absolute. The license merely certifies that the
agency believes that the licensee is qualified to practice the profession.
The agency will permit the licensee to practice that profession unless
he or she subsequently proves unqualified. In the same way, an adop-
117. 29 Cal. App. 3d at 919, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
118. See Note, The Rejected Applicant for General Assistance and His Right to a
Review, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 678 (1974).
119. County of Madera v. Carleson, 32 Cal. App. 3d 764, 767, 108 Cal. Rptr.
515, 518 (1973); Taylor v. Martin, 28 Cal. App. 3d 1057, 1059, 105 Cal. Rptr. 211,
212 (1972).
120. 4 Cal. 3d 130, 146, 481 P.2d 242, 253-54, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 245-46 (1971).
121. Id. at 146, 481 P.2d at 253, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
122. Interview with Dorothy Murphy, San Francisco County Adoption Agency, in
San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 7, 1973.
123. Id. See also ADOPTIONS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 9, at 4.
124. See, e.g., Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith, 32 Cal. App. 3d 204, 108 Cal. Rptr.
71 (1973) (revocation of real estate license); Collins v. Board of Medical Examiners,
29 Cal. App. 3d 439, 105 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1972) (revocation of license to practice med-
icine); Toczauer v. State Bd. of Registration for Professional Engineers, 20 Cal. App.
3d 1067, 98 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1971) (refusal to grant registration as industrial engineer);
Small v. Smith, 16 Cal. App. 3d 450, 94 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1971) (revocation of real
estate license).
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tion agency places a child with its prospective adoptive parents and
does not terminate that placement unless they subsequently prove un-
qualified to provide the child with a healthy home environment. The
parallel between the licensing of professionals and the placing of chil-
dren with prospective adoptive parents seems obvious, and thus it was
correct for the C.V.C. court to hold that an -adoption agency's decision
to terminate an adoptive placement is subject to independent judicial
review.
Conclusion
C.V.C. v. Superior Court is the latest refinement of the roles of
adoption agencies and the courts in determining which persons may
adopt in California. In holding that due process requires an admini-
strative hearing before an adoption agency can terminate any adoptive
placement which does not pose an immediate threat to the child's safe-
ty and that the administrative decision is subject to an independent
judicial review, the decision balances substantial interests whose rel-
ative importance is not unquestionable. Nonetheless, the court was
able to reach a decision which protects the individual rights of prospec-
tive adoptive parents without sacrificing the safety of the child or with-
out severely hampering the important function adoption agencies play
in arranging and supervising adoptions.
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